Written by Han Bing With the rapid growth of professional football, the ecological niche disparity between the two realms of modern football — "club football" and "national team football" — has expanded unprecedentedly.

The reality is that good coaches, whose abilities have been proven through countless matches, are less willing to take on national teams. On the other hand, the World Cup expansion has given second- and third-tier nations, which previously struggled to qualify, new hope, increasing the urgent demand for quality coaches in "national team football." This imbalance between supply and demand has led to ongoing difficulties in finding suitable national team coaches, as seen in Indonesia’s two coaching changes within a year.

A typical case of recklessness and opportunism

In just 281 days, the Indonesian Football Association chairman, Erick Thohir, suffered a complete failure in his high-stakes gamble on coaching appointments. After hastily abandoning Shin Tae-yong at the end of last year and then recklessly appointing Cruyff without thoroughly vetting candidates, Indonesia exemplifies the shortsighted and blind faith in celebrity status typical of weaker football nations in the World Cup expansion era. Among the 18 teams in the competition that changed coaches mid-tournament, the other seven opted for more cautious approaches. Australia, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman chose local coaches familiar with their teams; Qatar promoted the assistant coach from the previous regime; the UAE retained their former head coach; and Iraq selected Arnold, who, although seemingly unrelated, was well acquainted with Asian national team football from his time coaching Australia.

In contrast, Indonesia abruptly dismissed the Korean coach Shin Tae-yong, who had led the team for five years, simply because he dropped some naturalized players who struggled to integrate quickly. Despite his deep familiarity with Indonesian football and notable achievements — including guiding Indonesia to the final group stage of the Asian World Cup qualifiers for the first time in history, and securing a record of 1 win, 3 draws, and 2 losses against higher-ranked opponents, remaining undefeated against Saudi Arabia with 1 win and 1 draw, and drawing with Australia ranked in the top 25 globally, forcing Australia to change coaches — he was let go.

However, Erick Thohir was dissatisfied because he was pushing aggressively for a mass naturalization strategy, and Shin Tae-yong could not immediately give all new naturalized players significant playing time. The dressing room, filled with players of Dutch background, began expressing dissatisfaction with the coach’s tactics and player selections. Using the excuse of "considering the internal atmosphere of the Indonesian team and future strategic direction," Thohir fired the coach who was clearly more familiar with Indonesian football.

Ironically, nine months later, Thohir dismissed Cruyff for reasons almost identical to those for dropping Shin Tae-yong. As a Dutch football legend, Cruyff also failed to create harmony in an Indonesian squad almost entirely "Dutch-influenced," highlighting the underlying problem. Thohir’s blind faith in celebrity status and hasty attempts to quell public opinion, starting with his trip to the Netherlands last year where he only interviewed Cruyff, doomed the outcome from the start.

Naturalization strategy brings inherent division

Shin Tae-yong’s sudden dismissal earlier this year baffled even some naturalized players within the Indonesian team. After the home victory over Saudi Arabia in November last year marked a turning point, the naturalized players were just beginning to gel, only to lose their familiar coach and face an unfamiliar new one. Even more absurdly, Thohir claimed that all three coaching candidates were Dutch coaches familiar with Dutch-background naturalized players, but in reality, Cruyff was the only one. The interview process was also drastically shortened from the planned six days to a mere two-hour formality.

Before the official announcement, the Indonesian media questioned Cruyff’s suitability beyond his legendary status, noting his unimpressive coaching record and unsuitability for the high-stakes 18-team tournament. But for Thohir, eager to finalize the appointment and stabilize public opinion, the coaching selection was more of a "show." The Dutch coach’s arrival, along with the Dutch national team technical director, completed the final piece of Indonesia’s naturalization strategy. Cruyff’s fame was expected to bring more international attention to Indonesia, while coaching ability was not the primary criterion. Saudi Arabia’s football association made a similar mistake by hiring Mancini, unfamiliar with Asian football, based solely on reputation. However, the Saudis corrected course in time by appointing a former coach more familiar with their football, ultimately qualifying through playoffs. All seven other teams that changed coaches prioritized ability and familiarity over fame, achieving success: four qualified directly, Iraq and the UAE reached continental playoffs with hopes of final qualification, and even the weakest player pool, Oman, advanced to the fourth playoff stage.

The Indonesian media widely criticized Thohir, arguing that coaching appointments should prioritize ability over fame and celebrity. Cruyff’s failure made Thohir’s high-profile promise last year to resign if the team failed to qualify look more like a joke. Now, as the coaching selection process restarts, the candidate list proposed by the media closely resembles the lineup from when Shin Tae-yong was dismissed earlier this year. Knowing this, why repeat the same mistakes?